Prospect theory, reference-dependence, and loss-aversion are widely acknowledged as important elements affecting decision-making. Nevertheless, establishing and determining reference frames are not extensively analyzed in the literature; rather, in most applications, it is simply assumed that the reference frames can be represented through the status quo. This assumption, however, may lead to biased results, as not only the status quo affects reference frames, but also previous experiences or expectations, among many others.
INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of prospect theory in 1979 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , it has gained numerous supporters, while concepts such as loss-aversion and reference dependence are now common in the behavioral economics literature (Barberis, 2012; Karle et al., 2015) . Moreover, it laid the theoretical foundation for the development of noncompensatory models challenging the classic economic assumptions about utility and its impact is felt in fields from marketing (Hardie et al., 1993; Ho et al., 2006) to labor economics (Dunn, 1996; Fehr et al., 2008) , as well as medicine (Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003; Sokol-Hessner et al., 201 ) , safety (Flügel et al., 2015) and transportation (de Borger and Fosgerau, 2008; Dixit et al., 2015) , among many others.
Even though prospect theory was originally developed for addressing choices under risk, it is straightforward to extend its principles to any kind of choice situation involving expected utilities. Basically, prospect theory sustains the existence of reference frames and that the gains and losses relative to these reference points are valued differently by decision makers. Thus, in order to correctly assess the behavior, it is necessary to know the referential frame.
The majority of the literature contributions dealing with loss aversion assumes that the referential points are known a priori (e.g. de Borger and Fosgerau, 2008; Flügel et al., 2015) , which allows for clearly differentiating gains from losses and using different functional forms to include them in the expected utility functions. Normally, the reference points are assumed to be equal to the status quo. At first glance, it appears to be a sound assumption, when it is possible to identify the current conditions (for instance, when dealing with repeated choices). Nevertheless, as several authors correctly point out, references do not depend exclusively on the status quo, but also on the individuals' previous expectations (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) . Moreover, even if it were possible for the modeler to identify for certain these previous expectations (which is not), the model would still exhibit shortcomings, as empirical evidence indicates that reference frames are also affected by the choice-sets offered to the individuals (Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2007) , which is clearly illustrated by the well-known decoy-effect (Fukushi and Guevara, 2015) .
A possible way to address the aforementioned problems would be for the modeler to estimate directly the reference points as a part of the decision model. This way, the reference would appear as a parameter of the model, representing a change or an inflection point in the utility provided by a given attribute of the decision. Nevertheless, under the usual assumptions for the utility functions -see Maggi (2004) for a good overview on Sshaped utility functions -this approach is not feasible, as they are defined piecewise and are not twice differentiable around zero, which is a critical point for estimating the reference frames. This paper introduces an S-shaped utility function that is continuous and twicedifferentiable around zero, while still satisfying the main properties of loss-averse utility functions and microeconomic theory. This paper presents an extensive analysis of its properties, such as non-satiation, decreasing marginal utilities, axial asymmetry (which can be calibrated), etc. Such a representation offers multiple possibilities when dealing with loss-averse decision-making as it not only allows estimating the reference frames, but also how frames are affected by the individuals' characteristics and/or the offered choice-sets. The function exhibits a simple structure, which allows for an easy implementation in discrete choice models. Finally, the proposed approach is tested with the help of a study case that indicates that reference frames may indeed diverge from the status quo.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Decision-making is usually approached from a utilitarian perspective. It suggests that decision-makers q will opt for the alternative i, belonging to a given choice-set A q , that maximize their expected utility U. Random Utility Theory (Thurstone, 1927; McFadden, 1974) postulates that this utility can be represented as the sum of a representative component and an error term (ε). If we assume additive linearity, it leads to the following expression:
where X is a matrix representing the observed attributes of the alternatives and characteristics of the individuals and β a matrix of parameters to be estimated (whose rows are associated with the different elements of X, while the columns represent the different alternatives in the choice-set). The error ε can follow any desired distribution, but it is customary assumed to be i.i.d. Extreme-Value Type 1 (EV1) distributed, which leads to the well-known Multinomial Logit model (Domencich and McFadden 1975; MNL) .
Obviously eq.
[1] assumes a linear impact of the explanatory variables X over the utility function. This restriction, however, can be easily lifted by assuming that the elements of X represent, in fact, any possible transformation of the observed variables (e.g. an exponential or a Box-Cox transformation; Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2011) . Hence, eq.
[1] can be expressed in the following fashion.
where f(X) is a matrix function of X. This representation is quite convenient to characterize real behavior as economic theory suggests that the marginal utilities of a given good are decreasing. Thus:
where x is a given element of X (attribute of the alternative) that can be considered to be a good in accordance to the Lancaster's principles (Lancaster, 1966) . Therefore, it would be adequate to consider monotonically non-decreasing and concave functions for f(X) (obviously the function should have a negative sign if the considered attribute is an economic bad, such as the price).
Nevertheless, per definition, a discrete choice implies necessarily a trade-off. Thus, every time an individual makes a decision, they are giving assets and/or opportunities away. Therefore, it may be more convenient to represent utility functions in terms of changes relative to reference points representing resource and opportunity costs. In that case, giving more away than the reference would be considered as a loss (economic bad) while receiving more would be considered as gain. Hence, utility curves around the reference point for a given attribute should be S-shaped.
It is noteworthy, that discrete choice models per se are based on differences, but when considering linear specification, such as eq.
[1], a reference value for a given attribute does not have any impact on the utility differences. When considering non-linear specifications, such as eq.
[2], without references, it is implicitly assumed that the reference point is equal to zero.
Further, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , individuals may also evaluate losses differently from gains (both relative to the reference frame). Hence, in accordance to prospect theory, utility functions may exhibit an S-shaped form of a type described in Figure 1 :
FIGURE 1 -Utility functions under prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
Maggi (2004) summarizes the properties that utility functions should satisfy under prospect theory:
i) Function cuts the U-axis in the origin: (0) 0 U = ii) Non-satiation -function is monotonically non-decreasing:
Axial asymmetry (loss aversion) -losses are valued more than gains:
Decreasing marginal utilities -function is convex for x < 0 and concave for x > 0:
Maggi (2004) also considers a fifth condition for the axial asymmetry implying that ( ) ( ) U x U x x < − − ∀ , but it is straightforward to see that this condition will always be satisfied by continuous differentiable functions when the remaining properties are met.
Several specifications are proposed for loss-averse decision-making. They range from power S-shaped (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995 ; among many others) to exponential functions (Schmidt and Zank, 2002; Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) over kinked lines (Thaler et al., 1997) . Nevertheless, not one of these specifications is capable of satisfying all aforementioned properties over the whole domain of x (although the problems are minor and mostly limited to the close neighborhood of the reference point; see Maggi, 2004 for a good discussion).
The major inconvenience, however, is that all these functions are defined piecewise (hence, they are not twice differentiable around zero) and, thus, require the analyst to set the reference point a priori. While most applications simply consider the reference point to be equal to the status-quo (e.g. de Borger and Fosgerau, 2008; Flügel et al., 2015) , in many cases this information is not available. Further, it is established that reference frames do not only depend on the status-quo, but also on the individuals' expectations , the choice-set they face (Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2007) , and, eventually, other circumstances. While models have been developed to take the influence of choicesets into account (e.g. random regret minimization models; Chorus, 2012) , they fail to acknowledge that the extent to which an individual is susceptible to irrelevant alternatives depends on how familiar they are with a given choice-set.
Therefore, it appears much more appropriate for the analyst to attempt a direct estimation of the reference frames underlying a given decision. With that purpose in mind, the utility functions can be defined in the following manner:
where f(X) is a matrix function satisfying prospect theory assumptions and ω is a matrix of reference points to be calibrated. Notwithstanding, the reference frames can also be a function of the characteristics of the individuals and attributes of the alternatives as well as of unidentified variables that can be represented through error terms. Hence, ω can be depicted in the following fashion:
where Y is a matrix of characteristics of the individuals and attributes of the alternatives that may or may not be also contained in X (provided the model is identified), α is a matrix of parameters to be estimated and ζ is a matrix of error terms. g(X) is a matrix function, which for the purpose of this work would be assumed to be linear. Hence, replacing eq.
[5] in eq.
[4] results in the general specification for the utility being given by:
which allows for estimating the reference frames. Nevertheless, such a specification requires for f(X) to be twice differentiable around zero. Otherwise the model would not be able to estimate the parameters associated with the reference frame.
A SMOOTH TWICE-DIFFERENTIABLE UTILITY FUNCTION FOR NON-COMPENSATORY LOSS-AVERSE DECISION-MAKING
As can be intuited, the core of the problem is defining a smooth twice-differentiable utility function satisfying the properties of prospect theory. Here, the problem is that most Sshaped functions are bounded (e.g. arctan(x) or the logistic function) and are therefore unable to satisfy the property iii).
Let's define the following function:
where a b ≤ and 0 1 c < < are parameters to be calibrated. Such a function would exhibit a shape similar to the one depicted in the following figure (where 2; 3; 0.6 a b c = = = ):
FIGURE 2 -A smooth twice-differentiable utility function
As can be easily seen, f(x) is defined for all real numbers. Further, it is twice differentiable around zero, satisfying the main conditions suggested in the previous section.
The analysis regarding the properties of loss-averse decision-making leads to the following conclusions:
i) Function cuts the U-axis in the origin: iii) Axial asymmetry (loss aversion): Even though the analysis of the second and third derivatives after x (required for analyzing this property) does not lead to appealing closed-form expressions, it can be shown that for a b ≤ this property will be always satisfied, as long as
In any other case, the condition will not be met in the neighborhood of zero (the reference point) but it will be asymptotically satisfied (when x− > ∞ ). The length of the interval for which the property will not be satisfied increases as c approaches zero.
Obviously, if the analyst is not considering an economic good but an economic bad (such as costs or travel time), loss aversion would imply that b a ≤ , but the aforementioned condition still holds. iv) Decreasing marginal utilities: Again, this property requires the analysis of the highly-involved second and third derivatives after x. It can be shown that this property can only be satisfied if
the change of convexity will occur slightly after zero and vice versa. Regardless, it does not appear to have major implications, as it only affects the close neighborhood of the reference point and the effects of the decreasing marginal utilities are only significant as x increases.
If c approaches one, the curvature of f(x) tends to zero. In that case, f(x) would simply represent a continuous kinked line.
As discussed, the proposed curve satisfies all properties of prospect theory for
and exhibits only minor, barely relevant, problems for [ ] 1 ln(2) 1 c − < < . Given that the obvious advantages of considering a continuous smooth twice-differentiable utility function clearly outweigh the small inconveniences, f(x) is considered to be appropriate to characterize loss-averse decision-making.
As final remarks, it may be advisable to fix either a or b at one, as they may be highly correlated with the parameters of β (also to be estimated; see eq [6] ; the ratio b/a could be interpreted as a loss-aversion-index). For similar reasons, including error terms whose variability must be calibrated can also lead to identification issues.
Further, the analyst may decide to consider different exponents for both parts of eq. [7] . In that case, it cannot be guaranteed that the function will satisfy the properties of prospect theory. Nevertheless empirical evidence (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Flügel et al., 2015 ; among many others) shows no statistically significant differences between both exponents.
A STUDY CASE
To show the extent of the proposed approach as well as the advantages of estimating reference frames instead of relying on the status quo, the following study case is considered.
The data comes from an SP experiment on interurban modal choice conducted in Germany during 2014. The experiment was carried out in three waves (January 2014, March 2014 and April/May 2014), contacting students and employees of two universities in Berlin (Technische Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin), as well as employees of member institutions of the Leibniz-Gemeinschaft (for further details see BahamondeBirke et al., 2015) . Here, the respondents were asked to choose between different interurban public transport alternatives in Germany (regional and intercity trains, and interurban coaches; the interurban coach market had just been liberalized in 2013; Bahamonde-Birke et al., 2014) . Respondents were required to choose between a first pivotal alternative, representing a trip previously described, and a new one. Alternatives were described in terms of their travel time (TT in minutes), fare (P in €), number of transfers (NT), mode of transport -regional trains (RE; dummy variable), intercity trains (FVZ; dummy variable) and coaches (LB; dummy variable) -and a safety level.
In this case, the first alternative would obviously represent the status quo (as it is associated with a previously described trip). The survey also included the gathering of socioeconomic information as well as perceptual and attitudinal indicators, but for the illustrative purposes of this study case, only the attributes of the alternatives will be considered. Also for illustrative purposes, the dataset was limited to only consider trips that originally cost between 50€ and 80€. As the original survey considered trips ranging between 4€ and 300€, considering the whole dataset would require addressing heteroscedasticity issues while addressing the reference frames (which can be done, but it would only add noise to this explanatory example). After reduction, the dataset consisted of 2,446 observations. To address the reference frames, the following variable is defined:
where P i and P 1 represent the fare of the considered alternative and of the alternative 1, respectively. The fare associated with the first alternative also represents the status quo. δ, in turn, represents a gap indicating that the reference frame may diverge from the status quo. A positive value for δ would imply that the reference frame is set lower than the status quo; hence changes would be considered as losses even at price levels below P 1 . Conversely, a negative value would imply a higher reference frame (above the status quo). All remaining variables (travel time, transportation mode and number of transfers) are considered linearly. Hence, the utility function is defined in the following fashion:
where f(ω) exhibits a functional form as described in eq. [7] . To avoid collinearity problems, a is fixed at one and it was allowed for b and c to be calibrated. Obviously, loss aversion would require for b to be smaller than one, as travel expenses are an economic bad. The ASC of the second (new alterative) was fixed at zero, so that the ASC of the pivotal alternative can be considered as an inertia variable. The result of the model estimation is presented in Table 1 (for comparison purposes the linear model is also included) . As it can be observed, all estimated parameters exhibit the expected signs and, other than b, are statistically different from zero. A closer examination of the parameters associated with f(ω) reveals the existence of decreasing marginal utilities (c is statistically different from both zero and one), which is in line with our expectations. Further, it reveals a strong loss-aversion, as b is not statistically different from zero. It means that fare reductions below the reference frame are not associated with statistically significant increases in utility. Conversely, price increases above the reference frame imply a significant reduction of the utility ascribed to the alternative. Further, the parameter δ has a positive value and it is statistically significantly different from zero. It implies that the reference frame associated with the travel fare is indeed 8.42€ below the status quo and that current prices are also being interpreted as a loss. Therefore, in this case it would not be appropriate to rely on the status quo to depict the reference. A possible explanation for the phenomenon is that references are not solely based on the current situation but also on previous experiences and personal appreciations. Finally, the loss-averted model offers a significantly better goodness-of-fit that the linear model. Figure 3 presents the differences of utility associated with changes in the travel fare. Here, the x-axis represents the changes in the travel fare as compared with the status quo, while the y-axis represents the changes in utility. Obviously, increases in the fare are associated with utility reductions, but the interesting fact is that all changes above -8.42€ (the estimated reference frame) are perceived as losses and are, therefore, hardly penalized.
CONCLUSIONS
It is a well-established fact in behavioral economics that loss-aversion and reference dependence significantly impact the decision-making process. Nevertheless, determining the reference frames is not easy as they may be affected by several reasons, including the status quo, previous experiences, personal appreciation, choice-sets etc. Therefore, estimating and calibrating the reference frame is a significant issue for modeling in presence of non-compensatory loss-averting behavior.
Notwithstanding, the large majority of literature simply associates references frames with the status quo. The reason is that loss-averted utility functions are defined piecewise and, thus, it is necessary to know the reference frame a priori. This work proposes that reference frames should indeed be estimated and introduces a smooth twice-differentiable utility function, which allows for their estimation. This function satisfies all major properties of prospect theory, including non-satiation, loss-aversion, and decreasing marginal utilities (even though minor problems can be identified in the close neighborhood of the reference point).
A study case exhibiting the properties of the proposed approach is also considered. It shows that in the context of semi-compensatory lost-averted decision-making reference frames may diverge from the status quo. In fact, the study case shows that the reference point for travel expenses was 8.42€ below the status quo and, thus, even paying the current fare would be perceived as a loss. Previous experiences as well as personal appreciations provide plausible explanations for the phenomenon. Along this line, this example shows that simply considering the reference frame to be equal to the status quo may lead to biased results.
